AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTIONALISM
Terrorist attacks trigger novel policy responses. New policies selected by the federal executive after the 9/11 attacks strained against constitutionally permissible margins. Affected individuals lodged legal challenges to the new policies in federal court. Judges' responses ranged from self-abnegating denials of jurisdiction to aggressive repudiations of the executive's initiatives. The diversity of judicial responses prompted debate and analysis. The resulting scholarly literature is largely normative. Sustained attention to "what courts actually do" has been "sparse."
1 Nevertheless, the normative accounts of courts' role in national security emergencies that now dominate the legal scholarship include not only normative This essay examines the descriptive claim that judicial responses to national security emergencies are in some fashion distinctive and hence warrant special, separate justification or criticism. I argue that "national security exceptionalism" finds no empirical support in at least one important class of post-9/11 cases: challenges to emergency detention policies. 4 In the litigation trenches, judicial responses to national security emergencies do not match up with the responses predicted by any of the dominant theories found in the literature. Rather, they align more closely with transubstantive trends in public law and with judicial responses to nonsecurity emergencies. This suggests there is nothing sui generis about the behavior of courts in the domain of national security exigency, or at least that the thesis of exceptionalism is overstated.
One case from the October 2008 Term places in clear relief the close and largely unexamined relationship between national security jurisprudence and the larger domain of public law doctrine and practice. In Ashcroft v Iqbal, a five-Justice majority of the Court dismissed as inadequately pleaded a civil damages suit filed by a Pakistani national detained in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 5 On the one hand, Iqbal can be viewed (and indeed has been understood) as the most recent in a run of cases in which the Court has grappled with the granularity of the threshold pleading rule in federal civil actions. 6 On the other hand, Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion in Iqbal transformed dramatically the basic pleading rule largely by dint of emphasizing the national security context of the case at bar. Iqbal illustrates one side of the relationship between national security case law and the larger domain of public law: Emergencies are opportunities for sweeping doctrinal and functional changes affecting many 2 The distinction is adapted from Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 254-58 (Harvard, 1986) . 3 I use this term to describe only judicial responses to national security emergencies. None of the accounts addressand I am not concerned with-each and every case that might conceivably be subsumed under a "national security" label, from servicemen's religious liberty claims, see Goldman v Weinberger, 475 US 503 (1986) (holding that First Amendment does not prevent Air Force from prohibiting yarmulkes), to clashes between environmental rules with military training needs, see Winter v Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc, 129 S Ct 365 (2008) (overturning a preliminary injunction against the Navy that was based on threat to marine wildlife). 4 The kind of case study approach here raises problems of sample bias and selection effects. In my view, the noncriminal detention cases are the most consequential in terms of both security and liberty; they are also the most contentious. If this analysis simply throws light in a non-quantitative way on the direction and general motivating factors behind judicial intervention, I believe it contributes to the literature. 5 subject matters. The other side of the coin is the pervasive influence of familiar remedial and doctrinal strategies in what has been characterized as a unique body of national security jurisprudence.
Rejecting the descriptive claim of national security exceptionalism has consequences for understanding and evaluating federal courts' work in the face of national security exigency. Analyzing judicial responses to national security emergencies in tandem with the larger body of public law draws attention to transubstantive trends in judicial behavior, and also to the role that emergencies can play in catalyzing larger changes across the domain of public law. The analysis may have a further bearing on the emergent "national security" discipline in the legal academy.
The argument proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the disjunction between the outcomes predicted by the dominant accounts of national security jurisprudence and litigated outcomes. Part II compares national security cases first to a larger domain of public law and second, to a recent non-security emergency in which the federal courts played a minor role. Part III concludes by offering some tentative hypotheses about the consequences of rejecting the descriptive claim of national security exceptionalism.
I.
The literature on judicial responses to national security emergencies is diverse but largely normative. In one corner are celebrations of judges' counter-majoritarian role as a "corrective" to the popular democratic tendency "to give inadequate weight to civil liberties in wartime" or crisis, when panic and other emotions distort policy outcomes. 7 In another are prescriptions of broad judicial deference on the ground that "there is no general reason to think that judges can do better than government at balancing security and liberty during emergencies." 8 Intermediate positions posit judges as agents of social learning, 9 or praise their fidelity to separation-of-power ideals. 10 Seemingly disparate, these accounts are alike in two important ways. normative arguments. Second, all the descriptive claims share a common assumption: Each asserts there is something distinctive about the pattern of judicial supervision of emergency national security policies. Because each theory aspires to justify a normative account of the judicial role distinct to national security, it paints judicial behavior in the exigent national security domain as different from judicial behavior at other times. Implicitly or explicitly, the theories assume that some factor unique to national security emergencies-e.g., the tendency of democratic governments to echo public panics, the breakdown of multi-branch deliberation, or the executive's informational advantage and agility-already shape what courts do. National security exceptionalism is thus underwritten implicitly by the sense that judicial behavior changes in response to the unique dynamics of a security emergency.
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This Part begins by sketching briefly the five dominant theoretical accounts in the literature that identify regularities in judicial responses to national security policies on the way to making normative claims about what courts should do. It then describes the observed consequences of federal court litigation, in one particular area of law-non-criminal detention on national security grounds. Specifically, I gauge consequences by looking at judges' selection between different remedies. This focus on remedies is central to my analytical method. Remedies provide a more fine-grained tool for assessing the consequences of judicial action than dichotomous metrics such as win/loss rates or tendencies to deference that are used in other studies. Finally, I consider whether any of the five dominant theoretical accounts generate good predictions of observed outcomes.
Three caveats are in order. First, this Part isolates descriptive elements from accounts that are largely normative. To the extent they include description, the theories of the judicial role in national security on offer generally do not try to predict every case outcome in the way that a theory in the physical sciences might. Instead, a theory will "set an agenda" or "prescribe a direction" that fits a majority or large plurality of cases. 13 It will also provide a baseline to identify and to criticize outlying results. 14 A perfect hit rate is neither demanded nor ever found.
Second, theoretical accounts of the role of courts in regard to national security tend to operate at a high level of generality. None of the accounts examined in this Part identifies which of the American courts when national security is threatened." Cass Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 Sup Ct Rev 47, 50; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 Sup Ct Rev l, 1 ("Liberty-promoting minimalism can be found at diverse stages of American history."). Finally, bilateralilsm institutional endorsement is offered as the "framework for analysis that American courts have used in earlier eras of exigent circumstances." Issacharoff and Pildes, 5 Theoretical Inq L 1 at 5 (cited in note 10). Whatever the larger normative projects of these accounts, in each case there is a descriptive element that plausibly can be isolated. In each case, the descriptive claim implies that judicial behavior in national security cases is distinctive. 12 National security exceptionalism could take strong and weak forms. The strong form suggests that a unique dynamic directs outcomes in all cases touched by national security concerns. The weak version of national security exceptionalism suggests that exigent responses to national security threats elicit different judicial responses from exigent policies in other policy domains. This weak version of national security exceptionalism, which seems more plausible, is the one principally examined here. 13 David A. Strauss, The Intellectual Crisis of Judicial Conservatism *9 (unpublished manuscript, July 2009) (on file with author). 14 See, for example, Posner and Vermeule, Terror in the Balance at 271 (cited in note 8) (describing the result in Hamdan as "lawless").
judicial remedies it would prescribe or predict in particular cases, nor even discusses the question of remedial selection at all. This is a failing of each account. It is not clear that the cost to analytic parsimony from closer attention to the question of remedies would be great. But, the absence of discussion of remedies also means that none of the theoretical accounts can be criticized directly for failing to predict particular outcomes. 15 As a result, the analysis in this Part must proceed by trying as best as possible to identify the distribution of remedies implied by a given theoretical account, and then by comparing that inferred set of outcomes to the observed outcomes. Third, one counter-argument to my analytic project would point out that some of the theoretical accounts considered here are not limited to national security. Hence, it might be argued, they make no claim to identify a unique pattern of judicial responses in national security cases. Minimalism, to pick the most obvious candidate, took shape first as a general account of the judicial role. 16 The object of criticism here, the claim of descriptive "uniqueness," is thus chimerical. But this counter-argument is overstated. Even theories with broader normative ambitions are presented as especially attractive in the national security domain because the latter is one area of law in which courts follow the normative prescription. Consider minimalism, the most generalizable of the five theoretical accounts considered. Minimalism is presented as especially successful in the national security arena even though, its proponents concede, in other areas of the law it is only aspirational. 17 Minimalism may have broad aspirations, but its narrow claim to descriptive success is articulated most powerfully with respect to national security jurisprudence. Hence it is properly classified as a kind of national security exceptionalism.
A.
Scholarly attention to the judicial role respecting national security has produced five accounts of the federal courts' function: i) the "social learning" thesis; ii) heroic countermajoritarianism; iii) the executive accommodation account; iv) national security minimalism; and v) bilateral institutional endorsement. Each theory is "a set of interrelated causal propositions" that "hol[d] out the … promise of a successful explanation." 18 The five theories also leverage a descriptive account of what courts do to support a normative prescription about what courts should do. 19 The descriptive and the normative converge. Exceptions are cause for condemnation and criticism. The first account of the judicial role in national security is the "social learning" model. This model offers an explanation of judicial outcomes within a larger framework of historical 15 It seems to me unsatisfying, though, to defend a theory against the allegation of inaccuracy with the assertion that the theory operates only on a higher level of generality. Why bother with a general theory of judicial review in a given policy space if it bears no relation to judicial outcomes on the ground? 16 Second, the "heroic" model views the federal judiciary as a counter-majoritarian check on the political branches' tendency to trade away constitutional entitlements in moments of crisis. Like the social learning model, it starts from the view that at times when "the nation faced extraordinary pressures-and temptations" to suppress dissent and to target vulnerable minorities, politicians have succumbed to those pressures and have gone "too far" detaining and punishing individuals for their views or because of their ethnic, racial, or religious identity. 25 On this account, the constituent pressure on government to engage in animus-based measures lacking sound justification increases in wartime. For advocates of the heroic model, the "countermajoritarian difficulty" then becomes a "striking" advantage for the federal courts. 26 Insulated by life tenure, judges will resist the momentary heat-wave of invidious motives better than elected officials. 27 It is predictable and "appropriate," on this account, that "the judiciary gives greater protection to civil liberties than the legislature or the executive."
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Third, the "executive accommodation" model insists on the dexterity and informational advantages of the executive over both other branches, and argues on their basis that judicial interventions will in the aggregate do more harm than good. This model is based on the observation that the executive has an institutional advantage in responding to emergencies because of its ability to aggregate and process information, to respond quickly, and to do so in 20 27 See, for example, Chemerinsky, 40 UC Davis L Rev at 17 (cited in note 11). 28 Stone, Perilous Times at 544 (cited in note 7). 8 secret.
29 Judicial action will be characterized by high error rates because courts lack information and suffer from the same distorting influences as democratic branches. At the same time, "erroneous judicial invalidation of new security policies can produce large harms."
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The fourth model is national security minimalism. 31 Minimalism in general is characterized by a preference for "shallowness"-incompletely reasoned decisions that eschew theorization of divisive fundamental issues-and "narrowness"-resolution of as few legal or factual disputes as feasible per decision. 32 Standing alone, minimalism is "a strictly procedural instruction" that generates no guidance as to the choice between government and a private litigant. 33 In the national security context, miminalism has three traits: a demand for clear congressional authorization, the requirement of individual "hearing rights," and a preference for "narrow, incompletely theorized decisions."
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The final account of courts' role in national security, "bilateral institutional endorsement," endows the judiciary with a democratic deliberation-forcing function. It suggests courts are not well-placed to make first-order decisions about the allocation of substantive liberties. Judges' comparative advantage instead lies in identifying the appropriate institutional arrangement to generate optimal policy decisions. 35 In war and emergency, as power ebbs to the executive, judges insist on a sharing of decisional power between the two elected branches "with different democratic pedigrees, different incentives, and different interests." 36 On this account, better decisions emerge from the judicially mandated participation of multiple democratic actors. 37 The courts' goal, therefore, is the forcing of multi-branch democratic deliberation at a time when such deliberation has been short-circuited by exigency.
B.
What have federal courts in fact done? Do any of these theories successfully predict the responses of courts in actual cases? The purely descriptive literature is "sparse." 38 To take stock of the effect of judicial interventions into exigent national-security policy making, I look instead at what remedies courts have issued. A focus on remedies is instrumentally useful as a means of getting at the consequences of judicial intervention for three reasons. First, remedial selection is more varied and more consequential in practical terms than metrics such as win/loss rates or decisions to defer or not. Judges have within reach a range of remedial strategies, including injunctions and damages actions. Injunctive relief can also be tailored by being granted ex ante or ex post. Or it can be issued in retail or wholesale form. When courts toggle between damages and various injunctive forms, costs and gains to security or liberty may vary. Inattention to remedies elides significant differences.
Second, attention to remedies and their effects illuminates important timing questions and downstream consequences. It invites particular scrutiny of the question whether an individual judgment's effect rippled out to change larger institutional practices.
Third, a focus on remedies is more informative than separate treatment of substantive and procedural rules. For one thing, substantive rulings have been few and far between in the post-9/11 context. Little has turned on whether substantive constitutional rules are weakened in crisis times. 40 By contrast, procedural rulings have been consequential. The cash value of judicial intervention is a function of both interlocutory and final jurisdictional and procedural rulings that have little directly to do with the relative strength of substantive rules in times of crisis. 41 And, at least in the set of cases under examination here, there is thus "no room for a distinction between the abstract, analytic definitions of constitutional rights and remedial concerns that prevent courts from enforcing those rights to their 'true' limits."
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I attend here to one especially active area of national security law in which courts are relatively unbounded by statutory limits or channels: new non-criminal detention policies that emerged in response to the September 2001 al Qaeda attacks. National security concerns, of course, impinge also on the criminal law, surveillance regulation, federal disclosure law, immigration law, and financial regulation of charitable giving. But non-criminal detention is a useful object of isolated attention. It too presents novel legal issues, complex implementation challenges, and a rich body of case law. Unlike criminal cases or litigation under the Freedom of One way of explaining this result is by noticing the relative absence of criminal cases. Courts thus have few opportunities for what might be called offensive remediation-dealing with government overreach by, say, dismissing an indictment. Rather, they have instead engaged in defensive remediation by denying motions to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds and by demanding do-overs with more or different procedure. Hence, there have been fewer opportunities for merits rulings and more scope for policy arbitrage through procedural manipulation. 41 There is a large literature on whether courts should adjust substantive rules or remedies. See Requests for judicial supervision in non-criminal detention cases after September 2001 have taken four forms: injunctive relief granted before the government acts against an individual; injunctive relief granted to an individual after government has acted coercively; relief that restructures ongoing government operations (even if it is not in the technical form of a structural injunction); and damages remedies secured after a constitutional, statutory, or treaty right is violated. These four kinds of judicial relief diverge along several metrics. In opting between injunctions and damages, courts select between property rules and liability rules. 45 Judges also toggle along a temporal scale between more or less ex ante or ex post interventions. They can allow either retail or wholesale interventions. Remedial choice is thus multifaceted and complex. A synoptic view of the consequences of federal courts' intervention suggests that judicial selection of remedies in national security cases is asymmetrical. It is biased away from the granular toward the molar. Courts grant injunctive relief that disrupts and reorders the structure of entire government programs. They generally do not grant retail preliminary injunctive relief or individualized final injunctive remedies. Nor have litigants typically prevailed in suits for money damages pursuant to federal statutes, international law, or the Constitution. The post-9/11 remedial distribution is thus tilted toward broad remediation and away from individually tailored equitable relief or remedies at law. To illustrate this, I survey first individualized injunctive relief and damages, and then turn to what might be termed the more "structural" forms of interventions.
Individual injunctive relief
Injunctive relief can be sought before coercive government action happens. The warrant requirement for surveillance is a well-known example of ex ante regulation. Warrant requirements in the Fourth Amendment and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), as amended in July 2008, impel some limited prior judicial supervision of electronic surveillance in the national security context. 46 Although a warrant rule may alter the pool of surveillance requests, evidence of recent changes to eavesdropping policy is hard to discern. Even under the 43 5 USC § § 552 et seq. 44 Remedies in national security detention cases will, however, be distorted by a selection effect because the executive will choose ex ante between legal forms of detention based on its estimation of the expected judicial response. To the extent that almost all forms of detention-criminal, administrative, and military-were tried in somewhat haphazard fashion after 9/11, this selection effect does not appear to preclude the comparative analysis proposed here. 45 In non-criminal detention cases, ex ante remedies are vanishingly rare. No court has ever granted a remedy to an individual to prevent seizure or detention. Logistical difficulties obviously limit such remediation. Lawyers are scarce on the battlefield outside of law-school hypotheticals. In practical terms, government actors control and often can delay access to the courts for days or weeks. Despite the infrequency of ex ante intervention, the Supreme Court has in dicta disapproved of such relief. In Hamdi v Rumsfeld, a plurality singled out "initial captures," which "need not receive … process," as distinct from the judicially regulated subsequent "determination[s] … to continue to hold those who have been seized."
49 Four years later, the Court underscored that same message to federal courts. 50 As a practical and as a legal matter, federal courts are not now nor have they ever been in the business of regulating the direct application of coercion. By contrast, litigants who have been detained for some time do seek-and at one point fleetingly enjoyed-some ex ante relief from changes to the circumstances of ongoing confinement. But the availability of such relief is diminishing. Litigants detained at Guantánamo have sought relief from certain aspects of their confinement and from anticipated transfers to third countries. Citing fears of torture, some Guantánamo detainees from 2005 onward sought and sometimes secured judicial orders requiring the government to provide them with thirty days' notice of any transfer from the base. 51 57 Injunctive relief to prevent a harmful action, even long after an initial seizure, will thus likely remain a rarity. A second variety of injunctive remedy is sought after the government has taken coercive action against an individual in circumstances where that coercive action persists in time. Detention, most obviously, endures over time and is remedied by an injunction. Detainees typically seek injunctive relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus to dissolve ongoing detention and to secure release.
Despite the volume and rancor of political and legal debate over the availability of habeas corpus for detainees situated outside the territorial United States, individualized habeas relief as a direct result of a federal court order remains elusive. As of January 2010, federal courts had issued final judgments finding no lawful detention authority in thirty-two cases. But, only eleven detainees had been released. 58 A formal release order in a habeas case, therefore, is an uncertain predictor of de facto relief. Overall, 575 prisoners have been released from Guantánamo between 2002 and January 2010. 59 Final judgments in habeas cases were thus directly and proximately linked to relief in less than two percent of actual releases from Guantánamo. Implicitly recognizing this reality, district courts no longer direct release as a remedy but instead order "all necessary and appropriate diplomatic steps to facilitate … release."
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Habeas's individualized efficacy is unlikely to grow with the transition from the Bush to the Obama Administration. One of the central policy puzzles related to the closure of the Guantánamo detention operation is how to release detainees who are unable to return to their home countries due to a substantial risk of torture. 64 In short, doctrinal and legislative hurdles mean that, even in cases where a district court finds no lawful basis for detention and orders release, the habeas judgment as individual remedy will remain under-realized.
"Structural" rulings
There is a class of habeas cases in which federal courts have granted relief that has had the expected and realized consequence of transforming the institutional structure of a national security program in dramatic and wide-ranging ways. Individual petitioners do not, however, always benefit. The causal vector is largely indirect. Three cases in particular have intervened in ongoing security operations and wrought significant changes in the constraints to which the Government is subject. The relief in these cases is somewhat akin to that achieved by a structural injunction. The Hamdan Court's structural reform ambitions went further than mere reorganization of military commissions. The decision also addressed questions of detainee treatment that had been a focus of public and legislative debate since 2004. Its effects thus rippled beyond the military. In a holding collateral to its main result, the Hamdan Court decreed that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 74 extended to detainees at Guantánamo and beyond.
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The majority likely knew that Common Article 3's prohibition on "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment" had a direct bearing on interrogation and detention practices separate from the procedural issues at stake in Hamdan. As President Bush explained, the Court's reorientation of the benchmarks for interrogation "put in question" operations by diverse agencies, including the CIA, which had not been party to the Hamdan litigation.
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Hamdan's Common Article 3 holding catalyzed further institutional transformation. Eight days after the judgment, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum directing 69 548 US 557 (2006) . 70 Id at 613-35. See also id at 637 (Breyer, with Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, concurring). all services to conform to Common Article 3. 77 A year later, this instruction was superseded by a presidential directive setting forth a more reticulated understanding of Common Article 3.
78
Hamdan, therefore, began an extended sequence of changes to the terms and conditions of detainee treatment and interrogation not only by the armed services at Guantánamo, but more broadly by all federal agencies at diverse geographic locations. An unexpected collateral effect has been to push interrogation operations into the hands of allied countries, such as Pakistan and Egypt, with fewer restraints on torture or illegal treatment. 79 This globalized displacement effect has been little analyzed.
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Damages
Numerous suits for money damages have been lodged against the government in respect to non-criminal detentions after the 9/11 attacks. Several of these proceeded under the 87 This result is arguably in some tension with the new and more stringent pleading rules specified in Iqbal and discussed below. The second kind of domestic detention-in military custody via "enemy combatant" designation-was rare, even among the wave of first responses to 9/11. Among the three "enemy combatants" detained in the United States, one waived his right to sue as a condition of release.
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The only one to sue for damages, Jose Padilla, aimed at a former government lawyer in one law suit based on allegations that the lawyer played an instrumental role in designing torturous interrogation protocols. 89 The action survived a post-Iqbal motion to dismiss based on the alleged insufficiency of the allegations. 90 The ensuing decision is a possibly vulnerable outlier.
While citing Iqbal, the district court did not analyze extensively the effect of that case on pleading rules. Third, the government used immigration powers in its post-9/11 investigation to detain at least 750 non-citizen suspects pending inquiry by the FBI. Immigrants detained in that period, whether clearly linked to the attacks or not, were ranked by varying degrees of "interest." To enable continuing FBI investigations, some were subject to continued detention even after being cleared of immigration-related charges. Conditions of confinement were significantly harsher than those in routine immigration custody. During the ensuing detentions, some non-citizens endured physical or verbal abuse, as well as denials of access to legal counsel or medical care. 92 A companion case concerning similarly unsanctioned abuse during confinement settled in part for $300,000. 93 In another action, the federal courts dismissed challenges to the lawfulness of arrests-an issue going to investigative strategies-while allowing conditions claims to proceed to discovery.
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Fourth, military operations outside the United States have generated a significant volume of long-term detainees. The latter are either held by the U.S. Government (e.g., in Guantánamo) or transferred to cooperating foreign governments. Detention operations at Guantánamo, in Iraq, and in Afghanistan have led to damages litigation. Unlike domestic actions, where challenges to conditions have gained some traction, these suits uniformly fail. Federal courts dismiss the complaints on the theory that plaintiff-detainees held overseas lack constitutional rights that can be vindicated via a damages action or because defendants benefit from qualified immunity. 95 The final and related category of suits involves detention that is outsourced to foreign sovereign proxies or moved to CIA "black sites." Two actions against government officials based on detention in a CIA "black site" and in the proxy custody of another sovereign (Syria) have been rejected based respectively on the "state secrets" doctrine and the "special factors" exception to Bivens liability. 96 By contrast, a suit against private companies allegedly involved in the same program survived dismissal efforts grounded on the state secrets doctrine but will be subject to vigorous attack via appellate review.
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The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal will do little to change the daunting obstacles facing plaintiffs in these cases. the legality of his initial arrest. His complaint instead alleged discriminatory assignment to the ADMAX SHU and unconstitutional beatings and denial of medical care. By the time his case reached the Supreme Court, the district court had rejected statutory claims of religious discrimination and conspiracy, 99 while the court of appeals had knocked out Iqbal's due process claims. 100 The Supreme Court granted plenary review to former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI director Robert Muller. 101 Writing for a five-Justice majority Justice Kennedy reversed the Second Circuit to hold that Iqbal had failed to plead sufficient facts to meet the pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). 102 Some background is necessary to understand this procedural ruling.
Rule 8(a)(2) was long understood to establish notice pleading in federal civil practice. 103 Its drafters intended to "escape the complexities of fact pleading" under common law rules by opening wide the federal courthouse door and relying on post-discovery sorting to eliminate lowvalue suits. 104 The Court previously had rejected lower-court attempts to impose heightened pleading standards or new burdens of proof. 105 But in a 2007 antitrust action, the Court changed course. It held that district courts must ascertain whether a complaint supports a "plausible" inference of liability in antitrust actions. 106 Muddying the waters further, another decision weeks later flipped back to the familiar notice pleading formulation. 107 Summarizing the resulting guidance to lower courts, Judge Cabranes of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decried the law of pleading as "less than crystal clear and fully deserv[ing] reconsideration by the Supreme Court at the earliest opportunity." 108 In response, the Iqbal Court held that the "plausibility" standard first suggested in 2007 was not confined to antitrust but applied generally to federal civil litigation. It established a twostage test for "plausibility" presumptively applicable to all federal civil suits. First, a court should discard all "legal conclusions" and "mere conclusory statements" in a complaint. Second, it should ascertain if what remains "states a plausible claim of relief" in "context" by drawing on "judicial experience and common sense." 109 Applying this test, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded for determination whether Iqbal should be allowed to replead.
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Putatively a case about an emergency national security policy, Iqbal will not change any trend in national security damages litigation. Plaintiffs in such cases already face a thicket of procedural hurdles from categorical exceptions to Bivens liability to the "state secrets" privilege to qualified and absolute immunity. These threshold doctrines already direct dismissal before discovery. By raising pleading standards, Iqbal does not change even the timing of likely dismissal. It just endorses a new legal theory on which dismissal may be grounded. 111 The basic pattern will remain the same: Challenges against discrete, isolated, and unauthorized acts of abuse sometimes prevail, but suits targeting allegedly unconstitutional policies will be turned away at the courthouse door. As discussed in more detail below, Iqbal's effect on general civil litigation, however, was immediate and dramatic, in striking contrast to its consequences for the local domain of national security cases. 
Conclusion
A pattern emerges from this survey of post-9/11 case law about detention programs. Private litigants prevail in actions for what are de facto structural injunctions (although they do not have that technical legal form), which catalyze significant structural change in national security programs but yield few proximate benefits for the named petitioners. But private litigants meet limited or no success in seeking more tailored ex ante or ex post retail injunctions. Damages actions also are generally unavailing, except in a scattering of cases challenging discrete, isolated, and unauthorized acts of abuse or discrimination. Iqbal may render damages actions incrementally less likely to prevail . It is hard to see, though, this difference having much practical significance in the national security domain. 110 Before reaching the pleading question, the Court also confirmed the availability of interlocutory jurisdiction. Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937 , 1945 -49 (2009 . It then held that supervisory liability based on a defendant's "knowledge and acquiescence" was not available, at least for intentional government torts, an argument that prompted a lengthy reply by Justice Souter, who argued that the majority had overlooked the defendants' concession on this point. Compare id at 1948 with id at 1955--58 (Souter dissenting). 111 Seemingly contrary to this view are the results in both Al-Kidd and Padilla. But these cases do not alter the basic fact of Iqbal's inconsequentiality for national security. As an initial matter, it is unclear how to count decisions, such as Al-Kidd and Padilla, which do not grapple seriously with Iqbal's reformulation of the pleading standard. Even if these cases are indicative of future trends-which seems doubtful-they are evidence that Iqbal is opaque and that its two-stage doctrinal rule is easy to circumvent. Just as some lower courts for years resisted the Supreme Court's direction to hew to notice pleading, see Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 Tex L Rev 551, 552 (2002), so now that the Court has pivoted to fact pleading other lower courts will resist the transition. It is not only that the judiciary is "a they, not an it," but that the "they" is saddled with imperfect mechanisms of internal doctrinal discipline. Cf Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not an It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J Contemp L Issues 549, 554 (2005) ("Empirically, it is often costly or simply infeasible for the judiciary to coordinate upon a particular course of action, and to sustain that coordination to the degree necessary to affect the behavior of other institutions and actors."). 112 See text accompanying notes 189 to 196.
C.
What can be learned from a comparison of the observed consequences of judicial intervention in exigent non-criminal detention policies with the patterns of judicial action described in or extrapolated from the five, largely normative theories above? A faithful explanation of the federal courts' role in national security must explain both judicial parsimony in ex ante injunctions and damages actions and also the more ample role of courts in issuing de facto "structural" injunctions that affect whole national security programs. If one of the five descriptive accounts outlined in Part I.A captured the observed distribution of results, this would be evidence it had isolated a distinctive dynamic motivating judicial outcomes in these particular national security cases. But none of the theories achieves this goal.
The social learning thesis
The social learning thesis does not easily cash out into any expected pattern of remedial outcomes. It operates across history and does not select between contemporary remedial options. It predicts synchronic variance between judicial and elite consensus will be small. Courts, therefore, will generally accord deference to claims of necessity but resist claims of government power that track or echo historically discredited models. Taking social learning seriously, courts after 9/11 would resist measures that resembled past discredited security efforts, while accepting innovations. Dissents from today's decisions that endorse novel security responses would one day be celebrated as prescient when new information emerges about the flaws in current security programs.
But, this account does not describe well the actual outcomes and it casts little light on the differential treatment of narrow versus broad-gauge remedies. As the basis for the claim that national security jurisprudence is exceptional, that is, the social learning thesis provides scant support. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has done little to cabin the use of race-based or ethnicity-based criteria as proxies for dangerousness, despite the aversive precedent of Korematsu. To be sure, the absence of a post-9/11 mass internment of Muslim-Americans might be credited to the "social learning" of Korematsu. Another explanation would focus on differences in political economy. In the World War II internment, rival agricultural interests eager for land were an important motivating force for a round-up of ethnic Japanese living on the west coast. 113 The absence of similar interest group pressure on the east coast explains the absence of German or Italian internment later in World War II, and may also better explain the absence of Muslim-American internment today. Nor does Iqbal fit the social learning thesis. In hindsight, Korematsu at a minimum suggests that governments, after a security crisis, often act on the basis of invidious or inaccurate generalizations about disfavored minorities. Yet the Iqbal Court not only makes bias significantly harder to police, it also rests on carelessly racialized reasoning that even the government as litigator eschewed. As an initial matter, the Iqbal majority was cavalier about the risk of ambient animus distorting discrete outcomes in a national crisis. Leaning on his "experience and common sense," Justice Kennedy rejected out of hand circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent in Iqbal's case. Noting that the 9/11 attacks were "perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers … members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group … headed by another Arab Muslim," he asserted that it came as "no surprise" that responsive policies had "a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims."
114 "Common sense and experience" here served to deny Iqbal even the opportunity to identify bias through discovery.
Further, Justice Kennedy's logic is itself based on dubious premises about ethnicity and religion. As Judge Jon O. Newman explained in his opinion for the Second Circuit, "Iqbal is a Muslim and a Pakistani but not an Arab….
[H]is claim is fairly to be understood as alleging unlawful treatment … because officials believed, perhaps because of his appearance and his ethnicity, that he was an Arab."
115 Categorizing a Pakistani as an Arab, as Justice Kennedy does, is about as accurate as calling an American "European" based on a perception of shared ethnic heritage. 116 The Court's opinion thus rests on the very act of plainly erroneous racial miscategorization that Iqbal attacked as invidious. In short, it is not only that the "social learning" thesis provides little basis for predicting or understanding observed results in the case law but that Iqbal in particular casts doubt on whether the Court has learned much from its less noble history.
The heroic model
The heroic model is typically more aspirational than descriptive. If the heroic model is understood to rest on the assumption that democratic decision-making under emergency pressure will tilt toward animus-inflected error, either along racial or ideological lines, then federal courts should police resulting policies vigorously, applying searching scrutiny to check their rationality. Recognizing that money damages fall short as a substitute for incommensurable constitutional entitlements, 117 at a minimum because of valuation difficulties, advocates of the heroic model might tilt toward ex ante solutions without abandoning residual judicial review via damages actions. The most insightful advocates of the heroic model, of course, are not Pollyannaish. They recognize that political constraints bind judges and that emergencies raise hard policy questions. 118 As a result, they may endorse some judicial hesitation to intervene by ex ante or even in media res injunctions. But the result and reasoning of Iqbal, alongside the larger vacuum in damages actions, are difficult to square with a counter-majoritarian thesis. Reliance on structural injunctions alone seems radically underinclusive of the heroic model's goals. That model also struggles with the absence of individualized injunctive relief. It thus may well be that the heroic model identifies one important feature of judicial thinking and strategy, but it also underplays the complex influence and interaction of other factors. The heroic model therefore cannot underwrite a descriptive claim of national security exceptionalism.
The executive accommodation model
Executive accommodationists favor roughly the opposite distribution of remedial outcomes from the heroic model. They will reject out of hand ex ante or in media res judicial interventions. They also will be leery of constitutional tort litigation to the extent it limits future options by articulating new constitutional norms to constrain subsequent executives. Emergencies are unpredictable along multiple axes; it is impossible ex ante to determine what rules will be bent in the next one.
119 Yet accommodationists may also see utility in compensation if it can be separated from the norm-enunciation function of constitutional tort. They "fully agree" that "decisionmakers should at minimum take pains to commemorate the values or rights or interests that [were] overridden in the service of other commitments." 120 Indeed, if courts adjudicate damages actions after some lapse of time-which is inevitable given the glacial pace of civil litigation in federal courts 121 -then information asymmetries and the comparative cost of judicial examination and correction may have waned in the interim. The emergency itself is also more likely to have expired.
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The outcomes of cases decided since 9/11 do not converge on this pattern. To be sure, the observed pattern of remedies and their consequences illustrates federal courts' identification and insulation of a zone of discretion at the point of first contact between government and a threat. This explains the absence of ex ante remedies and the courts' reluctance, so manifest in Iqbal, to chill front-end discretionary decision-making. 123 To the extent that the executive accommodation theory suggests that the role of courts trends stronger as time elapses after an emergency, that 163, 191 (2008) . Since damages actions look back to past actions temporally proximate to the emergency, rather than examining continuing policies, they are not a form of "ex post sunsetting" whereby judges rescind emergency powers once they determine that as a matter of fact the emergency has elapsed. Id. 123 Ashcroft v Iqbal, 129 S Ct 1937 , 1953 .
theory finds little support in the judicial treatment of damages liability. Also, judicial remediation to date has clustered around the most invasive form of intervention-structural injunctions-while more tailored options have been slighted. That result obviously cannot be accounted for by a thesis of deference.
National security minimalism
In its tripartite form of clear statement rule, hearing rights, and decisional thinness, minimalism is offered as a template that "to a remarkable degree, captures the practices of the American courts when national security is threatened."
124 National security minimalism does not, however, predict well the overall pattern of remedies in national security cases. Courts have foregone tailored individual remedies, whether ex ante or ex post, in favor of quasi-structural injunctions in Hamdi, Hamdan, Rasul, and Boumediene. Rather than just changing conditions for one litigant, these decisions have each prompted institutional transformation in large national security programs. Hamdan's Common Article 3 holding in particular rewired not only military commission policy but also interrogation policy. The Court thus opted for wide-bore remedial strategies over a narrow approach. Its interventions disrupted government operations beyond the case at hand. Judicial responses in the national security context, that is, have been maximalist in important ways. The ruling in Iqbal is also hard to square with minimalism along several dimensions. First, the Court's grant of certiorari was unusual 125 insofar as there was no clear conflict among the circuits on either question presented, 126 and the second question challenged a theory of government tort liability-supervisory liability by constructive notice-that had not been raised by the plaintiffs or decided below. 127 A truly minimalist Court would rather incline against review where legal issues do not cleanly fit Supreme Court Rule 10's criteria for review. 128 The votes for certiorari review in Iqbal, indeed, seemed driven less by the legal issues presented than by the identity of the petitioners. 129 Second, the majority opinion cannot be described as minimalist. It swept broadly by possibly eliminating supervisory liability in damages actions against government officials for violations of constitutional rights. 130 Even more significantly, it reordered pleading rules for federal civil actions in a manner that likely will generate future uncertainty and disparities between district courts. Third, the Iqbal Court resolved the pleading dispute on broader factual and legal grounds than those suggested by defendant-petitioners. The Court could have side-stepped the problem of racial or religious bias in law enforcement by picking up on the uncontested fact, raised by defendants' brief, that 578 of the 762 detainees targeted by the investigation were not identified as being of "high interest" or placed in the ADMAX SHU. 131 That is, it could have looked to uncontested facts as a means to respond to
Iqbal's claim of bias. Despite its claims to descriptive success in the national security domain, minimalism thus fails to provide an accurate characterization of either the overall pattern of outcomes or specific results such as Iqbal.
Bilateral institutional endorsement
Like other accounts, bilateral institutional endorsement is presented as both descriptively accurate and normatively appealing. 132 Indeed, in his separate Hamdan concurrence, Justice
Breyer invited renewed democratic deliberation in terms that echo this theory's logic. 133 Yet, as with the other dominant theoretical accounts, bilateral institutional endorsement does not generate sound predictions for two reasons. First, democratic deliberation has not been the touchstone that the theory suggests. Second, the theory itself lacks predictive force because it contains no account of when or why courts should find democratic deliberation inadequate. The first problem is that bilateral institutional endorsement does not well explain constitutional rulings in cases such as Hamdi and Boumediene. The theory's proponents claim that Boumediene can be assimilated into this model as "an explication of the structural mechanisms that preserve" rights. 134 Yet the Boumediene Court rejected the twice-considered judgment of Congress that plenary habeas jurisdiction over Guantánamo was neither wise nor necessary. The Court not only found inadequate the jurisdictional scheme designed by the political branches but did so without even allowing that scheme to be tested and found wanting. Extending rights under the Suspension Clause and the Due Process Clause to detainees, the Court materially reduced the policy space of the political branches in the teeth of considered and repeated deliberative exercises of the democratic will. The second, more serious, concern with bilateral institutional endorsement's descriptive claim is its indeterminacy. Many cases in the national security domain, including Hamdi, Hamdan, and Rasul, hinge on whether a long-standing statute authorizes the executive branch to establish a novel policy that could not have been anticipated by the enacting Congress. The Court on occasion finds bilateral endorsement in statutory ambiguity. 135 Other times, it rejects innovation based on the absence of sufficient endorsement. Bilateral institutional endorsement supplies no theory to explain when and how the Court should read ambiguous statutes to support an innovative policy. Without this baseline, it cannot generate predictions in the large number of cases in which the Court is confronted by a claim of bilateral action grounded in legislative language of uncertain relevance. 136 Nor does the theory well explain what the Court has in fact done in the face of an ambiguous statute. In Hamdi, the relevant baseline seemed to be built of "fundamental and accepted … incident[s] of war." 137 But this term is far more opaque than district courts or commentators have recognized. 138 In Hamdan, the Court looked to a complex, and not entirely pellucid, blend of historical practice and statutory authorization. The Court may have a baseline in mind, in other words, but it may be a mutable and only partially conceptualized one that bilateral institutional endorsement does little to illuminate. Analysis of Iqbal and the damages cases through the lens of bilateral institutional endorsement suffers from the same drawback: It is impossible to determine what the baseline is against which the Court should view the availability of a Bivens damages remedy. On the one hand, the Court might believe that Congress has acquiesced to the availability of a Bivens remedy because "'where federally protected rights have been invaded it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies.'" 139 On the other hand, Congress might be presumed to recognize that today "the Court is reluctant to extend Bivens liability."
140
Absent some account of what the appropriate baseline is in damages actions, bilateral institutional endorsement cannot generate a meaningful prediction of results in damages cases any more than it yields forecasts of judicial responses to executive action resting on other marginal claims to statutory authority.
D.
To summarize, five accounts of judicial responses to new national security policies can be identified in the current literature. Each makes a claim of descriptive fit as well as normative persuasion. Each singles out a unique judicial response to national security emergencies based on its understanding of what makes the policy environment after such an emergency distinct. But, a review of the federal courts' remedial decisions in post-9/11 non-criminal detention cases suggests that none of these accounts yields a fully satisfying explanation of what courts are 136 Issacharoff and Pildes do not miss this problem; they implicitly recognize it when they discuss whether to treat an ambiguous statute as authorization for a contentious executive action. See Issacharoff and Pildes, 5 Theoretical Inq L 1 at 38-39 (cited in note 10). 137 Hamdi, 542 US at 518 (plurality). 138 The baseline is explored in Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. doing. This result provides a first reason for doubting the descriptive power of national security exceptionalism.
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II.
This Part develops a second reason for skepticism about national security exceptionalism. I argue first that the gap between judicial responses to national security emergencies and other problems of constitutional compliance within complex institutions and policies has been overstated. To a surprising degree, remedies in national security cases correspond to remedies in other areas of public law where federal courts have grappled with complex state institutions. I then examine one set of judicial responses to the financial crisis of 2008-09 to see whether courts behave differently in security and non-security emergencies.
A.
Federal courts have developed a distinctive set of rules and remedies in enforcing constitutional entitlements in policing, prisons, mental institutions, and education. While generalized accounts of this particular body of public law are sparse, some regularities are evident. In the larger corpus of public law, it is possible to discern trends in ex ante injunctions, ex post release via habeas, damages liability, and structural remedies. Examination of each of these four areas suggests that the judicial approach to national security is not as distinct as is generally believed from other public law domains. In both national security and general public law, there is an asymmetry between scarce-on-the-ground individual remedies and structural judicial orders that effectively re-organize government institutions. Benefiting a discrete litigant at bar is of secondary concern in both domains. Thus, common explanations may underlie judicial responses to exigent government programs in both national security and other public law domains.
Why are there such strong similarities between the remedies in national security cases and those in other public law cases? There are several possible explanations. It may be that judges model, either consciously or instinctively, their remedial strategies on familiar approaches in public law (an effect amplified perhaps via precedential learning). Or it may be that screening devices at the courthouse door select for similar kinds of cases in the two domains. Alternatively, and more promisingly in my view, the correlation may be explained by reputational or other judicial motivations that reach across substantive doctrinal boundaries. But construction of a larger model of judicial motivation and behavior is beyond my aims here. My goal rather is solely to show that national security cases are not sharply different from other lines of public law jurisprudence.
Consider first the absence of ex ante injunctive relief in national security case law, identified in Part I.B. Ex ante prevention of potentially unconstitutional government action, especially involving coercion, is almost always the exception in other areas of public law. Doctrinal barriers from abstention rules to "political question" constraints to standing doctrine generally push judicial intervention away from the front-end of government action. Plaintiffs cannot seek preemptive relief against anticipated government coercion without evidence that they specifically will be targeted. 142 In one area of police-citizenry contact frequently litigated in the Supreme Court-automotive stops-the Justices have stayed on the margins. "Officer safety" is the dominant concern of Fourth Amendment cases concerning the rules for encounters between police and drivers. 143 Even at the apogee of the Warren Court's criminal procedure jurisprudence, the "more immediate interest" that the Court recognized, documented, and protected was the protection of police against "unnecessary risk." 144 In its recent narrowing of the scope of permissible car searches incident to arrest, the Court still followed officer safety as its lodestar. 145 Current regulation of the use of police deadly force is also weak and ex post.
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The regulatory vacuum at the sharp edge of national security policy, in other words, is not distinct from the situation in analogous areas of social control. Rather, the national security case law is close to the norm rather than exceptional. Second, the absence of individual release via habeas corpus in national security cases is in line with trends in relief when habeas is used as a post-conviction remedy under 28 U.S.C § 2254. In the national security context, even named habeas petitions in landmark cases win minimal individualized relief and do not secure release. For the habeas petitioner, victory on procedural grounds instead generally leads to more process, more delay, and thus more detention. Winning in the Supreme Court, for example, meant Hamdan risked at worst indefinite detention and at best protracted delay until the reconstitution of new military tribunals. Hamdi and the Rasul petitioners also won Pyrrhic remands and the prospect of extended future litigation. Like petitioners under the Administrative Procedure Act seeking reconsideration of a feeble agency rule, detainees often found that success had the practical result of deferring a desired goal. 147 Although Rasul, Hamdi, and Boumediene did lead to releases, these followed indirectly from changes in policy and not directly from compliance with specific judgments. Detainees acquitted in new military commission proceedings also do not thereby gain freedom.
To the contrary, in July 2009 the general counsel of the Department of Defense emphasized that the Government reserved the right to continue to hold terrorism-related detainees after an acquittal under a claim of wartime detention authority.
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The situation is strikingly similar to quotidian federal habeas review of state court criminal convictions. Federal postconviction review of state criminal judgments today yields vanishingly small returns. A 2007 study found that of 2,384 noncapital habeas cases sampled, only eight resulted in a grant of habeas relief, and one was reversed on appeal. 149 transition from individual to government liability, 153 even as others scholars evince skepticism about constitutional tort's deterrence value. 154 Iqbal adds little novel to the familiar moves in constitutional tort law. Rather, Iqbal merely replays the Court's longstanding efforts to find some equilibrium between compensatory and expressive aims on the one hand, and the mitigation of disfavored deterrence effects on the other. 155 But the Court is not trading off between these two goals in any coherent way. The Court in Iqbal demoted tort's compensatory function. In another case the same Term, a unanimous Court marginalized constitutional tort's expressive function. 156 The net result is entrenchment of a regime of de minimis liability with no correlative expansion of the expressive or norm-clarification function. This regime is stable only because an elusive residual possibility of remediation suffices to deflate interest-group mobilization for congressional modifications. 157 Outright judicial repudiation of constitutional tort-so far a move the Court has not intimated-would probably be needed now to reset policy in any meaningful way. 158 Further, it is not clear that the magnitude of deterrence effects from government tort liability would differ between the national security context and the larger public law context, and in which direction any variance from the mean would be. 159 The scale of any overdeterrence from damages awards (under Bivens but also under 42 USC §1983) is not known. In part this is because the government often (but not always) provides defendants in individual liability suits with representation and pays settlements or judgments. 160 It is also not clear whether the risk of overdeterrence is greater or less in national security cases. It may be less because "[f]ear compels people"-including government officials-"to devote resources to solving a problem that for a dispassionate and uninvolved person may be interesting but not compelling." 161 Alternatively, the prospect of compensation for errors may ease conscientious officials' discomfort, making more stringent exigent responses less costly and hence more frequent. Absent empirical evidence about the motivations of government officials, it is impossible to know whether or how deterrence operates differently in national security and in general constitutional tort law. Functionally as well as doctrinally, it is therefore hard to segregate national security from the larger domain of public law when it comes to damages. The final trend that demands explanation is the surprising incidence of de facto "structural" injunctions in national security law. Here again, there is a correlation with trends in public law. Federal courts have grappled now for decades with allegations of pervasive constitutional violations within "large-scale organizations, particularly government bureaucracies [that] define to a substantial degree our social existence." 162 In these contexts, just as in national security, there is a persistent "large gap between executive discretion and judicial capacities." 163 Individual remediation, from the judiciary's perspective, is a suboptimal strategy because it has little dampening effect on the rate of future violations. The close link between right and remedy typifying private-law adjudication breaks down in complex environments, precipitating judicial experiments with broader, process-based remedies. 164 In a range of areas of social policy, from prisons to policing and from psychiatric institutions to education, courts instead select interventions that ramify beyond an individual case "to unsettle and open up public institutions that have chronically failed to meet their obligations and that are substantially insulated from the normal processes of political accountability." 165 Although structural injunctions common in the 1960s and 1970s are no longer frequent, similar remedial forms obtain today. These do not always take the form sensu stricto of structural injunctions celebrated by previous generations of legal scholars, but they are nonetheless orders that "see[k] to effectuate the reorganization of a social institution." 166 In a recent survey of de facto structural public law remedies, numerous judicial actions were identified in several areas of public policy that tended to "disentrench or unsettle a public institution when, first, it is failing to satisfy minimum standards of adequate performance and, second, it is substantially immune from conventional political mechanisms of correction. Boumediene aim to bring military detention into procedural conformity with the Justices' ideal of due process, the post-Brown incarnation of habeas (which did not endure long past the Warren Court) was a way of bring state criminal justice systems into conformity with another due process ideal. Far from being a tool of individual liberation one case at a time, perhaps the central purpose of twentieth-century and early twenty-first-century habeas has been justice at a systemic, aggregated level.
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One way of explaining the Court's willingness to grant sweeping structural remedies may be as a response to public and elite expectations of judges fostered by a heroic countermajoritarian narrative of the judicial role born in the second half of the twentieth century. On this account, Justices inherit and apply a heroic model of the federal courts exemplified best by 168 174 I do not mean to suggest, however, any conclusion about how effective quasi-structural injunctive litigation has been. This seems to me that is a hard, and properly contested, question.
Brown v Board of Education.
175 If Justices' role-conception and sense of prestige entails a commitment to a heroic model, they may prefer to channel interventions into high-profile cases in which their stance will be observed and celebrated, further enhancing their prestige. 176 Individual remediation, notwithstanding periodic judicial verbiage about the value of individual rights, 177 secures the courts little political or reputational capital. It is thus slighted. More cynically, this account might be supplemented by the suggestion that the Justices' reputational motivations are constrained by the possibility, however remote, of the public backlash that would ensue if an individual who gains individual relief later goes on to participate in a terrorist conspiracy. Here, the Justices' beliefs about the public reception of decisions play a large role. A less cynical account would posit that the Justices are allocating scarce judicial time and public support to maximize their constitutional goals. On this account, the emphasis on structural interventions is simply a way to secure maximal policy change with limited tools under conditions of constraining political opposition. There is, in sum, a correlation between courts' remedial strategies in national security law and in public law. Plausible accounts of the causal mechanisms behind this correlation can be imagined. Exploration of these causal accounts would demand further scrutiny beyond the scope of this paper. The important point here is that the similarity between national security cases and the general public law is a second source of evidence that the national security exceptionalism hypothesis is flawed.
B.
The mine run of public law cases is not the only body of jurisprudence against which judicial responses to national security emergencies might be compared. A second way of testing the exceptionalism thesis may be to look at judicial responses to crises that lack a national security dimension. By way of example, the financial crisis of 2008-09 precipitated numerous extraordinary legislative and executive initiatives designed to stave off an economic depression. 178 Despite claims that government responses overstepped constitutional bounds, 179 judicial challenges to the diverse regulatory reactions to the financial sector's failure 180 have been few and far between. The one exception to this pattern-the challenge to the bankruptcy sale of the auto-maker Chrysler's assets from Indiana-based pension and retirement funds-does not support the proposition that federal courts behave differently in national security emergencies than in non-national security crises. In April 2009, Chrysler filed a pre-packaged Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the Southern District of New York with the support and involvement of the federal government. The petition proposed the transfer of substantially all of Chrysler's operating assets to a new entity to be part-owned by the Italian firm Fiat.
181 Indiana pension and retirement funds attacked the sale as, among other things, a sub rosa reorganization. 182 After the bankruptcy judge and the Second Circuit signed off on the proposed bidding procedures and sale, the Second Circuit nevertheless temporarily stayed the sale so as to allow Supreme Court review. 183 Despite urgent pleas to enjoin the sale, and even though a sale would have been very hard subsequently to unwind, the Supreme Court declined to intervene via its emergency stay power. 184 Two aspects of this complex litigation are salient here. First, as in the national security context, the federal courts identified "consequential and vexed" 185 constitutional issues in the asset sale but nonetheless declined an invitation to ex ante intervention. The Roberts Court resisted any temptation to follow the example of the Chase Court's short-lived and ill-fated effort, one hundred and fifty years previously, to regulate the Lincoln Administration's emergency resort to paper money in response to the fiscal crisis created by the Civil War. 186 The absence of ex ante judicial regulation in this case echoes the pattern observed in public law more generally. Second, the mechanism of an asset sale used to reconstitute Chrysler in its "basic structure" is "increasingly … the norm." 187 That is, in its details as well as in the overall shape of judicial supervision, the federal courts' response to this part of the financial crisis did not break new ground but mimicked a pattern emerging under non-emergent conditions. 188 In sum, while this snapshot of judicial responses to the financial crisis is no doubt incomplete, it does provide an additional datum in support of the thesis of commonality in judicial responses across policy areas.
III.
What is the significance of this continuity between remedial strategies in national security cases on the one hand and in public law generally on the other? If national security exceptionalism is either overstated or untenable, what follows for our accounts of judicial behavior in the national security domain? In the balance of this essay, I identify two possible lines of further exploration. One is analytic, the other normative.
The first possible lesson is analytic: To understand judicial responses in the national security domain, it is necessary to look at interactions between that area and transubstantive bodies of rules concerning procedures and remedies. This interaction can have implications both for substantive bodies of law-e.g., the direction of national security law-and for transubstantive procedural and remedial rules. At the moment, however, interaction effects between substantive law and procedural rules are insufficiently studied.
Iqbal furnishes an example of this interaction. Consider the result in Iqbal from two different points of view: the decision's effect on national security law and its impact on general civil litigation. As national security litigation goes, Iqbal was a damp squib. It will not have a significant effect on damages litigation in the area because few cases prevail anyway. 189 But,
Iqbal works a sea change in the general federal civil litigation landscape. 190 Iqbal "has exponentially expanded the reach of fact pleading" and repudiated the notice pleading rule applied for more than fifty years. 191 In even the first two months after it was handed down, Iqbal was cited in 603 district court and court of appeals decisions 192 ; it also triggered a movement for legislative reform. 193 Anecdotal data suggest that the elevated citation rate reflects new decision costs that flow from heightened uncertainty about an elemental pleading rule. 194 The odd combination of local inconsequentiality and global significance is the result of an interaction between a substantive field of law and transubstantive rules. The opinion manages this feat because the Court's opinion muddies the distinction between national security concerns and transubstantive procedural questions. Justice Kennedy warned of the "heavy costs" exacted when government officials are sued, costs present whenever the government is restrained 195 but "magnified" in the national security context. 196 Justice Kennedy then implicitly reasoned from this local diagnosis to a transubstantive result.
Iqbal is not unique in this regard. In 1949, Judge Learned Hand wrote a path-marking opinion on official immunity in Gregoire v Biddle, which concerned the arrest and prolonged detention of a French national erroneously believed to be an enemy alien during the Cold War. 197 Gregoire provided the basis for the Supreme Court's twentieth-century resurrection of immunity doctrines based on concern about the possible chilling of official action in all areas, not just national security. 198 As in Iqbal, analysis of an issue apparently local to the national security context motivated a larger transubstantive change. Both Gregoire and Iqbal illustrate a mechanism beneath the oft-overlooked truism that "each dispute … affects others and reshapes the political landscape, inhibiting some behaviors and enabling others." 199 While some consequences of the efflorescence of a federal common law of official immunity are reasonably clear, it remains to be seen how Iqbal's change in pleading rules will alter the pool of civil cases filed, especially in the national security domain, and how this change will in turn stimulate further shifts in the federal civil pleading regime or other transubstantive rules. This kind of interaction may be frequent, even if not pervasive, in legal doctrine. Consider the interaction between the Court's changing attitude to the death penalty on the one hand and its adjustment of habeas rules, or the interaction of standing doctrine with environmental law. 200 There is no reason national security law would be free of it. This dynamic also raises important institutional design questions. Consider, for example, the optimal approach to changing transubstantive procedural rules. On one account, Iqbal achieved this with low decision costs: Reliance on national security-specific reasons eased the adoption of the new transubstantive rule. From a wider perspective though, the wisdom of changing transubstantive rules through reasoning rooted in one substantive area of law may be doubted. Even if a more robust pleading rule were needed-a matter about which I express no view here 201 -it is difficult to defend the manner in which the Iqbal Court chose to rewrite that rule. There is a statutorily designated avenue for reconsideration of procedural rules: a multi-stage rule-making procedure set forth in the Rules Enabling Act. Rule-making under the Act likely would have generated security and larger dynamics in public law may be troubling. Spillover effects that result from the convergence of national security with general public law, such as in Iqbal, may create an incrementalist avenue to across-the-board abrogation of the federal courts' liberty-protecting function. 209 Routinized emergencies, or even a persistent flow of cases arising from one emergency, may therefore have broadly corrosive effects. On the other hand, continuity between national security law and other domains may strengthen the prophylactic effect of the federal judiciary's presence. The belief that judges have a stable disposition or follow constant rules may induce beliefs on the part of other governmental actors that minimize rights violation. 210 The net effect of the analysis, in short, is uncertain from a civil libertarian perspective. Another normative consequence of the rejection of national security exceptionalism for civil libertarians may be the need to rethink the role of democratic politics in setting emergency responses. The trajectory of national security programs is thought to be wholly fixed in the "red hot" furnace of emergency. 211 This emphasis on emergency can be generalized into a model of sovereignty as "unitary and decisive, committed to its own invulnerability" and insulated from democratically determined legal rules. 212 But, the rejection of national security exceptionalism turns attention away from a narrow focus upon how best to respond to specific emergencies, and toward the matter of how a democracy "surviv[es] the emergency situation with integrity as a democracy." 213 That is, how should doctrinal and judicial incentives be structured to ensure the continuity of rules, procedures, and remedies across emergencies and other times? If this kind of integrity is valued-and, of course, many reject its significance-courts might be institutional mechanisms for the preservation of a larger public "culture of civil liberties." 214 Alternatively, it may be that emergencies are moments at which such a culture is abandoned or incrementally sapped. From an alternative normative perspective more concerned with security, similar questions arise about the judicial role in national security and its effect on the broader operation of the federal judiciary. One final consequence is worth noting. "National security law" is fast becoming a subdiscipline within the legal academy with a paraphernalia of case books, specialists, central questions, and well-defined camps. In the early stages of this development, there may be an understandable tendency to make claims on behalf of the sub-discipline's insulation from other legal debates. My analysis of national security exceptionalism suggests this would be an error.
Scholars of national security law will learn more by comparative glances across disciplinary lines than by the construction of distinguishing walls or isolating moats.
CONCLUSION
National security exceptionalism does not find substantial support in the behavior of courts in post-9/11 non-criminal detention cases. The remedies that courts provide in these cases are surprisingly consistent, however, with the approach taken in other domains of public law. Taken together, these results provide some reason to view judicial responses to exigent national security policies not as exceptional but as thoroughly imbricated in the larger texture of American public law.
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